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Part 1. Introduction
The United States of America, the world’s most powerful and 
prosperous nation, is paying its bills with IOUs.
Our nation emerged from the travails of World War II with a debt greater than 
its income (measured by its gross domestic product, or GDP).  For the next 35 
years, in an uneven trend with fits and starts, our country generally followed a 
path of virtue.  By the 1970s, the public debt was only about one-fourth of our 
collective income.  This was not so much the result of the eight actually balanced 
budgets over the 28 years from the end of 1946 through 1974 (the highest and 
lowest debt years as percentages of GDP, respectively).  In fact, the debt measured 
in dollars by 1974 was almost half again as large as that of 1945.  However, the 
economy grew substantially faster than the debt over those years, which made the 
debt much easier to manage, and much less of a burden on the economy and the 
taxpayers.
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Over the next 30 years, however, apart from a near-
decade of surpluses and very small deficits (for which 
both political parties claim the credit, in a dispute that 
remains unresolved), the growth in debt outran the 
economy.  Then, the recession that began in December of 
2007, and the financial panic that surrounded it, drove the 
already elevated debt to new heights.  By the end of the 
last fiscal year (2010), once the statistical dust settles, the 
debt will have exceeded 60 percent of the GDP.  By the 
end of the decade, without significant changes of policy, 
the debt is likely fully to equal our GDP.  Almost all of 
the progress that was made since the end of World War 
II to reduce the debt burden on our taxpayers will have 
been lost.  And even worse, the debt will threaten the 
future prosperity, and even the economic stability, of our 
country. 
The American people seem restless because of the 
apparently troublesome federal budget and the rapidly 
growing public debt.1  Still, there are few signs of real 
urgency among our elected policymakers, and certainly 
there is no consensus about what sacrifices are needed to 
address the problem, and only reluctant discussions across 
the political aisle.2  Should the public even care?  Should 
the voters communicate a sense of urgency to their 
elected policymakers?
To begin to answer those questions, the public needs to 
know:  What are the potential consequences if the nation 
fails to address the federal budget problem?  The current 
budget woes are far beyond any peacetime experience 
of this country since its founding.  Other countries 
have become equally beset by rising debt, though their 
experiences reflect different circumstances or different 
times.  Still, those lessons need to be understood, and to 
be translated into the here and now.  It can happen here.
What follows is a story – really, six stories.  First comes 
a created background story of the next two years – 
told retrospectively, in the fashion of a newspaper or 
magazine.  This story takes our nation to the brink of an 
eminently likely crisis of excessive debt.  Following that 
are five alternative stories – told similarly, as retrospective 
newspaper or magazine articles – of how the following 
years might unfold.  None of these alternative futures 
is pretty.  The happiest (or least-unhappy) ending 
requires a crisis-driven scramble to head off the worst 
consequences of continuing weakness and neglect.  The 
four other alternative futures, however, are far worse.  
Their consequences range from economic stagnation 
to financial catastrophe.  If our nation follows any one 
of those paths, today’s children and their succeeding 
generations will lead poorer and more stressful lives. 
As we contemplate what CED believes to be these very 
real possibilities, we must ask ourselves:  Is this the future 
we want?  Or even for the more optimistic:  Is this a 
future we want to risk?
We provide yet another possible ending – starting with 
the same fiscal risk that we see on the horizon today, but 
proceeding to a self-realization to rededicate our people 
and their elected policymakers to responsibility and 
sacrifice for the well-being of future generations.  To us, 
this course leads to a far better outcome for the American 
people.
Today’s generation of elected leaders must accept 
responsibility for the condition of our economy.  They 
must choose our future.  And the citizens of today must 
follow, or guide, or drive them to the best path, if we are 
to achieve a sound and secure future.
1 For example, in January 2002, 35 percent of poll respondents ranked reducing the budget deficit as a “top priority” (respondents 
were permitted to name more than one issue as a “top priority”); in January 2010, that had increased to 60 percent.  The Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press, “Energy Concerns Fall, Deficit Concerns Rise: Public’s Priorities for 2010: 
Economy, Jobs, Terrorism,” January 25, 2010, http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/584.pdf. 
2 For example, the Congress has not passed a Budget Resolution in 2010, and the President’s Fiscal Responsibility and Reform 
Commission has struggled to reach bipartisan consensus.
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Part 2.  Future Background, 2010-2012
Sleepwalking to the Brink
How Politics and Money
Drove the World’s Leading Nation
To a Financial Crisis
Sunday, July 29, 2012.  For almost a century, the United States has been a constant in global finance and 
business.  Even in the financial meltdown of 2007-2009, U.S. Treasury securities were 
perceived as a safe haven for investors, a destination for a “flight to quality.”  
Events of the last two months have shaken those perceptions of the 
United States as bedrock for investors.  Though the changes of recent 
weeks have seemed sudden, they began in that earlier financial crisis, 
and even before.  This week, as market players are called upon to react 
to recent events, many say that they still are trying to understand just how 
the seemingly certain core of their financial world came to this uncertain 
juncture.  With such high stakes in the coming decisions, even the most 
jaded market movers want to understand the past.
One Wall Street trader, who wished to remain 
anonymous to protect the identity of his firm, is typical. 
“It is totally unreal,” he said at the close of trading on 
Friday.  “The world has changed completely in my years on the Street.  
It has happened quickly, but it has also happened so slowly, if you 
know what I mean.  Years of imperceptible changes have added up to 
something profound – profoundly threatening, really.  It is hard to go 
back and see each individual step that got us here.”
Analysis.
Contributions from staff reporters in New York and Washington.
Just two years ago, after months of financial turmoil, the U.S. economy finally showed signs of finding its feet.  
Growth resumed in late 2009.  Employment stopped falling, and began to turn around – although never with the 
rapid rebound that had followed the deepest previous recessions of the post-World War II era.  After nerve-wracking 
hesitation and uncertainty, financial crisis in Greece was forestalled by cooperative action of the European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund, seeming to halt a possible contagion to other weak European states.  With 
considerable excess productive capacity in the United States, and also around the world, because of the tepid global 
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recovery – in part because the reach 
of the financial crisis into Europe 
weakened the economic outlook 
there – inflation, which had been 
feared by many because of the 
extraordinary anti-recessionary 
financial measures undertaken by the 
Federal Reserve and the Treasury, 
never became an issue.  America and 
the world took the time for a sigh of 
relief.
Still, to the public at large, the 
nation’s climbing debt levels in the 
wake of the financial crisis were 
vaguely disquieting.  After the 
plunging home values and under-
water mortgages that set off the crisis 
and the fallout for retirees, typical 
working people reacted adversely to 
the notion of rising debt, especially 
as it weighed on their plans for 
retirement and on their legacies for 
their children.  The notion of rising 
public debt seemed less immediately 
pressing than the private debt of 
their households.  Most people were 
less than familiar with the history 
of debt crises elsewhere around the 
world.  Greece had given people 
some image of what government 
irresponsibility could do, though they 
correctly recognized that the United 
States and Greece were in almost all 
respects quite different.
The mid-term election of 2010 
yielded large-scale change in the 
Congress.  The two parties, as was 
their wont, pointed fingers at each 
other over the budget and every 
other issue.  For the voters, there 
was a typical sentiment that those in 
office “owned” the economy and the 
budget; sophisticated analysis of who 
had been right, who had been wrong, 
and who was responsible did not 
capture the public imagination.  The 
result was a “throw-the-bums-out” 
election of proportions comparable to 
the strongest in history.  The nation 
was left with a divided government, 
because the party in power was 
not successful in defending its 
many vulnerable seats; but some 
incumbents of the minority party 
suffered too.  So with the major 
reshuffling of the Congress beginning 
in 2011, there was no chance for 
either party to dictate a legislative 
agenda before the next presidential 
election in 2012.  Gridlock ensued.
The modest upturn in the economy 
continued.  The president and his 
party claimed that this improvement 
indicated that they had been right 
all along, and that the country 
was finally seeing the fruits of the 
policies of the past two years.  The 
opposition countered that their new 
strength in the Congress, stalling the 
Administration’s agenda, caused the 
economic growth.
The public debt itself seemed to 
recede, slightly, as an economic issue.  
With modest economic recovery 
came some limited but visible relief 
from the large deficits.  The sense 
of comfort was fed by continued 
low interest rates.  With inflation 
remaining quiescent, interest rates 
rose little.  So although the public 
debt rose, the cost of debt service 
in the budget hardly budged.  There 
seemed to be little need to forgo 
spending, or raise taxes, because of 
the higher debt.  Thus, continuing 
large budget deficits seemed almost 
benign.  Talk even of “deficits don’t 
matter” began to return:  Deficit 
alarmists had been crying “wolf ” 
for years, and the problem never 
materialized; the alarmists had been 
wrong before; so surely they would be 
wrong again.  There remained a sense 
of American exceptionalism: that “it 
can’t happen here.”
So for these reasons, politics returned 
somewhat to usual, with the budget 
deficit smoldering in the background. 
The President’s “fiscal responsibility 
commission” had failed to reach 
a bipartisan agreement, and even 
though it had presented a menu 
of ideas judged to be balanced and 
sound by nonpartisan experts, it 
had been largely ignored.  Some of 
those ideas were included in the 
President’s subsequent budgets, but 
those budgets were “dead on arrival,” 
in the language of Capitol Hill.  The 
Congress and the President fought 
those budgets to standstills before 
splitting their differences, with little 
or no change in the overall direction 
of spending and revenues.  Debt 
accumulated beyond past danger 
signals, topping 60 and approaching 
70 percent of the GDP, but no one 
reacted.  Attention was diverted.  
Within the United States, with 
the budget apparently on hold, 
policymakers jockeyed for position 
for 2012, and debated the wars in 
the Middle East, climate change, 
immigration, and implementing 
health reform.  Around the world, 
the financial markets focused on the 
troubled countries in Europe more 
than the United States.  The change 
in the financial markets was at first 
gradual, almost imperceptible – but 
then frighteningly sudden.
The President’s new budget in 
the election year of 2012, and the 
statements of his opponent, followed 
the pattern of four years before.  
The opposition party said that the 
President had caused the deficit with 
his policies of the previous years of 
his term; the President said that the 
bed was on fire when he got in it.  
In these positions, both sides were 
apparently sincere.  The problem was 
that each argument reflected only a 
partial view of the complex reality, 
and the conflict made it difficult for 
the typical voter to make his or her 
own informed choice.  But beyond 
sincerity, each party believed that 
it held a political winning hand.  
The opposition believed that the 
electorate could be convinced and 
reminded that a President of four 
years had to own the economy and 
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its consequences, while the President 
remembered and spoke continually of 
the colossal problems that he found 
when he raised his hand to take the 
oath of office.
Each party sought to outdo the 
other in ruling out any pain.  The 
President’s party pledged once again 
to avoid any tax increases on all but 
the best-off two to three percent of 
households, and strongly defended 
the largest and fastest-growing 
benefit programs – Social Security, 
Medicare and Medicaid – and the 
new health-care reform.  But even 
among themselves, the President and 
his own Congressional delegation 
often disagreed.  Some ruled out 
any entitlement reductions – or even 
proposed increases.  Some proposed 
large tax increases on the well-to-
do, while others denied that there 
was a budget problem at all.  The 
opposition again pledged not to 
increase any taxes, and had already 
committed during the health-
reform debate of 2009-2010 not to 
cut Medicare.  Some political and 
economic “talking heads” blamed the 
electorate for failing to understand 
what was needed to right the budget.  
Other commentators blamed the 
candidates for failing to talk straight 
to and educate the electorate.  But 
either way, the debate took on an 
air of what in retrospect clearly was 
unreality.  Few voters seemed to 
worry, because it had happened so 
many times before.
In competing to be the most 
definitive in defending Social 
Security and Medicare and opposing 
tax increases, both parties showed 
that they had learned all too well 
the political lessons of the previous 
20 years.  The electorate always 
told pollsters that they wanted 
straight-talking candidates, but then 
proceeded to pummel the candidate 
who first said that he or she would 
impose any pain to reduce the budget 
deficit.  So in the 2012 campaign, no 
candidate would go first.  Instead, the 
contenders offered pledges of deficit 
reduction from economic growth 
(which had always been assumed in 
the nonetheless disturbing budget 
numbers) and from spending cuts in 
unspecified programs, or in “waste, 
fraud and abuse,” or in foreign aid, 
or welfare, or other inconsequentially 
small programs.  Thus, even before 
the campaign was in full swing, both 
sides had explicitly foresworn every 
essential step of a deficit reduction 
program that would be in scale with 
the true size of the problem.
It was during the campaign year 
that the U.S. fiscal colossus began to 
crumble.
The budget outlook at the start of 
2012 had the deficit down from its 
peak of 2009 but still much higher 
than would be sustainable, and then 
rising into the future.  To avoid 
offending the voters, the President 
made no painful decisions in his 
budget.  When the nonpartisan 
Congressional Budget Office 
evaluated that budget, it projected 
resulting deficits significantly higher 
than claimed by the President 
himself.  The opposition candidate 
was not required to present a formal 
budget, of course, and broad-
brush campaign promises cannot 
be subjected to detailed analysis.  
However, to appear no less attractive 
to the voters, the candidate proposed 
even less by way of specific steps to 
cut spending – and of course pledged 
never to raise taxes.
Predictably, budget experts in the 
policy community began to repeat 
more loudly the unavoidable 
conclusion, which in truth they 
had believed for some time (and 
specifically, in several preceding 
election campaigns):  Neither 
potential president was positioned 
to take any significant steps on the 
budget for the next four years.  As 
this realization spread to the financial 
markets, global confidence that the 
United States eventually would face 
up to and solve its fiscal problems 
finally began to deteriorate.
Meanwhile, ostensibly positive 
developments from overseas made 
the U.S. picture even more troubling.  
In Europe, three years of pain and 
budgetary retrenchment began to 
bear fruit.  Greece, Portugal, Italy, 
Spain and Ireland, which two years 
before had been in danger of default, 
clearly had made good on their fiscal-
responsibility programs.  Their debt 
began to sell more freely on financial 
markets.  The threat to the European 
banks that held much of their debt, 
and to the rescue program that had 
been assembled by the European 
Union and the International 
Monetary Fund, was lifted.  The 
markets sent the euro up, not just 
because of the positive economic 
news, but also because of the positive 
signal of the accomplishment of the 
Community’s mission of imposing 
fiscal discipline and safeguarding its 
currency. 
At the same time, China began to 
show signs of steadying maturity 
in the international financial 
community.  The administered value 
of the renminbi had been raised in 
small amounts over the preceding 
years, and now rumors began that 
the value would be allowed to float in 
bigger steps toward its market value.  
Anticipation of a rising Chinese 
currency spread.
On the surface, the success in 
Europe and the maturing of China 
as a financial market were in turn 
a relief for the U.S. economy.  The 
fear of European economic and 
financial collapse had put a damper 
on U.S. markets, and that in turn 
made both consumers and businesses 
more cautious.  During Europe’s 
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downturn, weaker U.S. consumer and 
export demand had yielded weaker 
business investment, which fed back 
into consumer demand in a vicious 
cycle.  Now, that restraint was over.  
And a more mature Chinese market 
economy was expected to be more 
predictable.
But the supreme irony was that such 
good news carried bad news.  With 
apparent economic recovery, central 
banks around the world, including 
the Federal Reserve, accelerated their 
programs of raising interest rates 
from what had been low, stimulative 
levels toward their historical norms.  
Though the accumulation of U.S. 
public debt thus far had seemed 
benign because of the extraordinarily 
low interest rates, the debt had grown 
so large that even a move toward 
normal rates quickly made the debt-
service cost problematic.  And as 
the euro and the renminbi became 
more attractive, naturally enough, 
the dollar began to fall relative to 
them, and U.S. securities became less 
attractive to foreign investors.
So slowly at first, but then at an 
accelerating pace, higher budget 
deficits and the reduced political 
prospect that they would be 
addressed frightened investors, who 
raised interest rates still further, 
which made the budget deficit even 
worse.  This basic adverse feedback 
loop was further worsened by the 
impact of this development on the 
rest of the economy.  Consumers 
were just working their way above 
the surface from their under-water 
mortgages, and broader economic 
growth raised the prospect of the first 
healthy demand for housing in years; 
but rising interest rates dragged that 
process to a grinding halt.  Businesses 
newly interested in investment 
suddenly faced rising borrowing 
costs, slowing that component of 
growth.  State and local governments 
had been squeezed by the economic 
slowdown and the tepid recovery, and 
rising interest rates did not help their 
plans for renewed public investment.  
So the federal budget was worsened 
by the direct impact of rising interest 
rates, and then the rising interest 
rates slowed the economy, which 
worsened the budget still more.
The rest of the world reacted to this 
adverse feedback loop.  Some years 
before, the petroleum-producing 
countries of the Middle East had 
spoken privately about changing the 
peg of the oil price from dollars to a 
currency index or “basket,” or even 
to some other currency, and rumors 
of those conversations spread and 
raised doubts about the dollar.  But 
from 2009 through 2011, with the 
European economies so weak and the 
Chinese currency held artificially low, 
those Mid-East discussions ceased.  
Now, with the rise of potential 
alternatives to the dollar, open 
discussions of choosing a successor to 
the dollar for pricing oil were heard 
again.
And on another front, the adverse 
U.S. political prospects for budget 
action along with the rising deficit 
forecasts led bond-rating agencies 
to begin to downgrade U.S. Treasury 
securities.  In a concrete sense, 
these rating downgrades had little 
practical consequence, because 
Treasury securities continued to 
be sold at auction – rather than 
being placed starting at estimated 
market rates, like all other U.S. debt 
securities.  However, with the rating 
downgrade, foreign governments 
that had held much of their reserves 
in dollar-denominated securities, 
but had deliberated privately about 
changing their investment decisions, 
began to shift their purchases slowly 
toward the yen, the euro, and even 
the renminbi, to give their portfolios 
some measure of diversification.  
These shifts were unannounced, 
but close watchers of the Treasury 
market detected the movements 
and reported on them.  The news 
moved quickly from the computer 
worksheets in the back offices of the 
financial industry into the popular 
press.  The psychological impact on 
investors was like a slow-motion 
car crash; what seemed at first like 
a painful but tolerable pressure 
became more and more intense at a 
quickening pace.
Thus, as the campaign year wore on, 
the hitherto relaxed attitude on the 
budget turned to tension.  Previously, 
the opposition candidate assailed 
the budget deficit but said little 
about solutions, while the President 
blamed his predecessor, touted the 
limited steps already taken and 
the vague promises in his current 
budget, and hoped for accelerated 
economic growth.  But now, with the 
economy slowing and interest rates 
rising – ironically, the weak economy, 
by calling the Treasury’s ability to 
service the debt into question, helped 
to drive interest rates up – the entire 
population began to feel the strain.  
Prospective purchasers of new homes 
and autos – a small but significant 
group – were being priced out of 
those markets.  Even worse, those 
households that had variable rate 
loans – including most entrepreneurs 
with small business loans – found 
their payments going up.  Those small 
businesses were losing revenues at the 
same time as their debt-service costs 
grew.  People – which is to say, voters 
– began to demand answers, and the 
more-sophisticated press began to 
raise meaningful questions of the 
candidates.
The problem could have been 
addressed and solved by sitting 
policymakers, but unfortunately, the 
political campaigns had infected the 
halls of government.  Congressional 
leaders tried to run interference 
for their presidential candidates – 
and for their own colleagues, who 
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were running for reelection.  The 
Congress tried to postpone action on 
the required annual appropriations 
bills to avoid making painful and 
potentially politically damaging 
decisions.  With divided control, 
it was easy for the opposition to 
say “no” without offering specific 
alternatives.  With interest rates and 
debt-service costs rising much faster 
than forecast, the public debt limit 
was reached during the campaign, 
well before it had been expected.  
The Treasury Secretary reached into 
his tool kit for all of his authorities 
to finance the government without 
issuing new debt and therefore 
breaching the limit, and at first 
appeared in the clear to avoid a crisis 
before election day.
These machinations solved the 
superficial political problems.  
However, after the first moments 
of relief in financial markets, 
investors quickly concluded that the 
fundamental problem of excessive 
U.S. borrowing and debt was not 
being solved, but only postponed 
– for yet another four years.  
Confidence in the willingness of 
Americans to face up to and solve 
their problems, which had been 
eroding for weeks and months, finally 
collapsed.
Concern intensified into anxiety, and 
then accelerated into panic.  Public 
confidence was deteriorating rapidly.  
It became clear that the candidates 
and the sitting Congressional 
leadership could no longer ignore the 
issue, but would have to act – or at 
least say much more specifically what 
they would do.  But in keeping with 
the politics of the day, that meant 
assuring the voters that the problem 
could be solved without sacrifice or 
pain.
What evolved amounted to a 
public negotiation, in which the 
parties never met privately, but 
instead put their offers on the table 
as proposed legislation.  It was an 
unfair fight, in that the President 
had to govern, while the opposition 
candidate could posture and make 
unrealistic claims – just up to the 
point where the public would hold 
the opposition accountable for the 
painful consequences of the financial 
market paroxysms in the absence of 
an agreement.  But it did amount 
to a real negotiation – because with 
divided control of the Congress, 
votes from both parties were needed 
to pass any legislation, including 
the required annual appropriations 
bills, spending reductions and tax 
increases to reduce the deficit, and 
an increase in the debt limit to allow 
the Treasury to go back to normal 
operations in the financial markets.
Each side in this Kabuki dance 
believed that it was driven by the 
purest of motives – within the 
irrational constraints imposed by the 
politicized Washington environment.  
That is, each side believed that its 
goal for policy was the right one, 
and that if it could only hold on long 
enough and squeeze the other party 
hard enough, right would prevail.
The President believed that the 
electorate would come to see that 
the objective of his party – to protect 
basic entitlements for the most 
vulnerable, paid for with higher but 
arguably still moderate taxes imposed 
on the most well-to-do – was the 
best choice.  In the President’s 
perception, that was what had 
happened during the last partisan 
budget wars over 1995-1997, and he 
firmly believed that it would happen 
again.  The opposition would cave 
in the negotiations, a face-saving 
compromise would give the President 
most of what he wanted, and the 
political and financial crisis would 
end happily.
Not surprisingly, the opposition 
held a very different view.  They 
believed that the voters, offended 
by the large budget deficits of the 
last four years and the rescues 
for failing financial institutions, 
corporations and homeowners, 
would come to understand that the 
nation needed smaller government, 
reduced entitlements, no or limited 
tax increases – or even lower taxes 
on the most successful – and the 
“freedom to fail.”  After all, every 
American hoped to be successful, 
and even those with modest incomes 
now would want the prospect of 
lower taxes when they achieved their 
expected successes, and would work 
harder with that incentive.  There 
had been a clear political reaction, 
including the “Tea Party” movement, 
to the higher spending under this 
President.  So the opposition, like 
the President, believed that popular 
opinion would force the other side 
to “cave” in the implicit public 
negotiations, and that the ultimate 
face-saving deal would lean heavily 
their way, instead of the President’s, 
and the problem would be solved.
At the same time, as real as this 
public negotiation was and as pure 
as the motives on each side, from the 
outside and at the end of the day, it 
arguably was driven by street- (or 
even gutter-) level politics.  Neither 
side – neither the President nor the 
opposition party – believed that their 
negotiation would end in stalemate.  
But both sides also believed that 
they would win if a stalemate did 
occur.  The opposition believed that 
a financial meltdown would doom 
the President’s reelection campaign.  
The President believed that perceived 
minority intransigence would 
sweep him back into office, and his 
Congressional party with him.  Thus, 
with the wisdom of hindsight, the 
failure of the election-year budget 
negotiation was foreordained.  
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Neither side wanted a breakdown, 
but each side believed that in the 
event of a stalemate, it would win 
both politically and substantively – 
and so each side acted in the end in 
a fashion that made the negotiations 
fail.  One participant in the process, 
who insisted on anonymity, said 
afterward that “…it was like 
watching World War I unfold on a 
theater stage before your very eyes.”
The implicit negotiation broke down 
in predictable fashion.  The President 
and his Congressional leadership put 
forward a package of appropriations 
bills with modest savings, limited 
reductions in Medicare physician 
and hospital reimbursements for 
savings in entitlements, and small 
tax increases focused on high-
income individuals and corporations.  
Provisions of the 2001 and 2003 
tax cuts, which had been extended 
temporarily only for lower- and 
middle-income taxpayers, were 
extended further.  The full expiration 
of these tax cuts could have raised 
significant revenue to address 
the deficit.  Coupled with those 
provisions was an increase in the debt 
limit to allow the Treasury to raise 
new cash to fund the operations of 
the government.
The opposition rejected that offer.  
They countered with reinstatement of 
the expired tax cuts for upper-bracket 
taxpayers from 2001 and 2003, 
repeal of the most costly features of 
the new health reform (which had 
not yet taken effect), a new voucher 
program for Medicare, an optional 
Social Security system for current 
workers with reduced benefits but 
supplemental private accounts, 
much larger but unspecified future 
reductions in appropriations for non-
defense spending (but increases for 
defense and other security programs), 
and a smaller increase in the debt 
limit.
Neither side’s offer came close to 
solving the actual budget problem.  
Each side believed that the other 
would provide new concessions to 
close the actual gap.  Instead, the 
President’s counteroffer reduced 
targets for future appropriations 
slightly more than his original 
plan, and the opposition’s response 
squeezed Medicare reimbursements 
a bit more and made the increase 
in the debt limit somewhat larger.  
There was no movement with any 
meaningful consequence for the 
budget problem.
So in the very early hours this 
morning, after firing rhetorical shots 
wrapped in hints of counteroffers 
from late Friday through Saturday 
evening, the two sides accused each 
other of refusing to negotiate in good 
faith, and of lacking a fundamental 
understanding of the needs of 
the nation’s economy.  Each side 
announced that this difference can 
be resolved only by the voters in the 
election, still 13 weeks away.  Markets 
were unsettled at the close on Friday, 
and key market participants are 
divided on how investors will react 
at the Monday opening.  Some 
believe that the long track record 
of the United States addressing its 
problems, even if sometimes after 
ugly political disputes, will maintain 
calm.  The fact that financial 
problems in Europe and Japan still 
conceivably could recur, and that 
China remains an untested quantity 
in international finance, suggest that 
the United States will continue to 
be perceived by investors as a “safe 
haven.”  This optimistic view will 
be measured by a limited Treasury 
auction tomorrow, and much 
larger auctions on Wednesday (the 
quarterly refunding auction) and 
Thursday.  Although the Treasury is 
barred by the debt limit from issuing 
additional securities, its auctions to 
refinance maturing debt with sales 
of short-term bills and notes are 
sure to be watched closely by market 
participants and policymakers at 
home and abroad.
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But meanwhile, seasoned market 
players looking back on more 
than 30 years of budget battles in 
Washington are shell-shocked over 
what they have seen.  “I’ve watched 
this argument go back and forth for 
decades,” one trader who insisted on 
anonymity said this weekend.  “But I 
never thought that it could come to 
this.”  After a brief pause, this trader 
added, “Now I wonder what else I 
never thought I would see is going to 
happen.”
A second highly placed market 
player expressed his anxiety in 
political terms.  “Look, I’m a rock-
ribbed conservative.  I deplore big 
government.  I hate taxes.  But if I 
could turn the clock back, give a little 
ground, and stop this landslide short 
of what might happen in the next 
trading day, would I do it?  You bet I 
would.”
An economist who served in 
government under two past 
administrations expressed similar 
anxiety.  “We had just better hope 
that the financial markets don’t 
panic, and the economy keeps 
growing, until we settle this thing.  
The Treasury and the Fed borrowed 
massively to shore up banks and 
stimulate the economy a couple of 
years ago.  We can’t maneuver like 
that now.  If anything goes wrong, 
we’ll be like an ocean liner with no 
rudder and no lifeboats.  Washington 
had better get real, and fast.”
But political figures still have not 
gotten that message.  One liberal 
congressional leader expressed no 
remorse.  “We swept the board in 
the 2008 election, but we gave our 
people virtually nothing in the next 
two years.  We were punished for that 
in 2010.  If we don’t stand fast now 
against the conservative agenda, what 
good are we?”
Or as a conservative House member 
said, in direct opposite, “We are 
on the brink of a major political 
triumph.  We will kill the liberal 
agenda for good if we just hold our 
ground until election day.”
Interest rates have spiked, and major economic indicators 
have deteriorated during the budget breakdown.
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What would the next step for our economy and our society be?  No one knows for sure, because our 
nation never has fallen to such depths, and our financial markets and their linkages to our economy 
are extraordinarily complex.  However, there are several likely alternatives, and the following 
subsection explains one.
Quake From Treasury 
Default Spreads
More Dominoes Fall –
President Calls for Calm
Sunday, October 14, 2012.  The economic fallout from August’s default by the United States Treasury continues to 
spread, with signs that its reach will be far broader than was originally anticipated.  The financial markets have frozen 
in near panic, and numerous businesses and banks have felt the repercussions.  The President and his election opponent 
are being pressed on the campaign trail for a response to the crisis, but their reactions have been limited to mutual 
accusations of failure to bargain in good faith.
The Treasury was unprepared to react when the August 1 auction of securities, which was to achieve the quarterly 
refunding of large numbers of maturing Treasury bills, notes and bonds, unexpectedly was far undersubscribed.  Market 
observers reported that buyers simply did not want to make commitments to government securities after the markets 
became increasingly convinced that resolution of the federal budget crisis was likely to wait for perhaps years after 
November’s presidential election.  Without the cash needed to redeem the maturing securities, the Treasury turned to 
the Federal Reserve.  But the Fed refused to intervene, citing the need to maintain its credibility in the international 
financial markets.  As a result, the Treasury was forced to postpone redemption of the maturing securities. 
Analysis.
Contributions from staff reporters in New York and Washington.
Some opinion, even on the part of well known 
economists and financial market players, had suggested 
that a Treasury default would affect only isolated 
individual investors and foreign governments.  However, 
the last 48 hours have demonstrated that the reach of the 
default extends in a web that is widening in all directions.
Immediate reaction from markets and investors was sharp 
and swift.  Treasury prices fell across the board, raising 
yields even above the nervous levels of the past few 
weeks.  A securities analyst from London who requested 
anonymity was blunt.  “Investors thought that they could 
redeem U.S. Treasury securities upon maturity without 
question,” he said.  “Now, we see that is not true.  If 
you cannot redeem maturing securities, you cannot sell 
earlier-term securities.  If you cannot sell, the wise man 
will not buy.”
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Government finance experts fear that U.S. access to the 
credit markets could be constrained for years.  As one 
academic explained, “For an individual or a business, the 
good side of bankruptcy is that you get out from under 
some of your debt.  The bad side is that you have difficulty 
borrowing for some time to come.  After all, prospective 
lenders fear that it could happen again.  For the federal 
government, this is a long stride beyond the past debt-
limit scares, when Treasury secretaries borrowed from the 
government’s own trust funds.  This is a failure to make 
scheduled redemptions.  Even if the government recovers 
quickly, lenders in the future will fear that it could 
happen again.  And if this drags on, well, as an ‘owner’ of 
America, I’m embarrassed, and also quite nervous.”
The Treasury has been struggling to maintain some 
order in the nation’s finances.  There is no clear directive 
stating which claims against it that the nation should 
pay first.  Redeeming some maturing Treasury securities, 
while perhaps maintaining some financial credibility, 
would discriminate against those whose maturing bonds 
were not redeemed.  Meeting all other claims against 
the government on time might delay the moment when 
the Treasury can redeem the outstanding matured bonds 
and thereby perhaps restore some of the nation’s financial 
honor.  Reports indicate that the nation is updating 
its financial strategy by the hour.  All federal agencies, 
including domestic operations, embassies abroad, and 
even the Pentagon have been told to put their operating 
decisions on hold.
The fallout quickly spread to the private sector.  Among 
the first institutions to report direct dislocations 
were banks and insurance companies.  Beyond the 
problems from the turmoil in the securities markets 
broadly, financial institutions had counted on 
redemptions or sales of their Treasury securities as 
the ultimate backstop to meet their obligations.  
Some banks halted lending activities, and a 
few even were forced to postpone interest 
payments to their insured depositors in the 
face of unusually large, nervous requests 
for withdrawals.  Ironically, some of the 
worst affected banks, suffering runs on 
their deposits, had been following what 
were thought to be the most conservative 
practices by holding relatively larger quantities 
of ostensibly gilt-edged U.S. Treasury securities.  
Some insurance companies have had to postpone 
payments on annuities, and even claims on losses 
because of fires, accidents and deaths.
One example of the bizarre fallout is the 
situation of Lisa Jones, of Clifton, Maryland, 
who is holding the mortgage loan of her 
late mother after inheriting the house, and the 
mortgage, four months ago.  The bank is pressing Jones 
for the payments that have been due since her mother 
died, but Jones does not have the cash in her own budget, 
which is stretched to the limit already.  Her mother 
took out a modest life insurance policy as protection for 
this eventuality, but the insurance company is delaying 
payment because its own entire portfolio has suffered in 
the chaos following the government default, and it cannot 
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own risk.  The bank says that in the past it has offered 
short-term loans to help, but it is cash-constrained 
because of its own problems redeeming Treasury 
securities.  “Everyone says that they want to help.  My 
mother did all the right things.  The late fees are piling 
up, and the bank threatens to foreclose on the house,” 
Jones says.  “Where do I go?”
Rising interest rates have squeezed numerous private 
borrowers, who have adjustable-rate mortgages and 
other loans, while some businesses have receipts that 
are set in dollar terms by longer-term contracts.  Small 
businesses have reported particular problems in meeting 
their obligations.  Business investment has essentially 
halted, as credit markets are frozen and loans are 
available at stratospheric interest rates if at all.  Retail 
and wholesale businesses cannot refinance their routine 
inventory holdings.  John Holden, who has run a used 
car dealership outside of Newark, New Jersey for 13 
years, uses short-term credit to finance his selection of 
two to three dozen cars.  “Times are tough, and we cover 
a segment of the market that serves people who need 
transportation and can’t buy new.  We should be doing 
well,” he says.  “We’ve been in this community, we’ve 
established our reputation as trustworthy with both 
consumers and our bank.  Now the bank can’t or won’t 
offer to renew financing.  Even if you can find a new 
bank, it means starting from scratch, which takes a lot 
of time, and establishing that relationship all over again.  
And every bank I’ve seen says they have no money to 
lend.”
State and local governments have been shut out of the 
credit markets as well, tarred by the federal government 
default, hurt by the federal government’s inability to 
deliver on its grant payments for Medicaid and other 
joint federal-state programs, and priced out of the 
credit markets by high interest rates on bonds and 
outright rejections from hard-pressed banks.  As a result, 
governments cannot finance their ongoing highway 
and school construction projects, and because of the 
repercussions for their operating budgets, even day-
to-day operations.  Teachers, police and fire personnel, 
whose jobs were threatened in the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis and its continuing fallout, are under the gun again.  
Many have been asked to work without pay until the 
federal default is resolved.  Teachers in the Bridgeport, 
Connecticut school district have spent six months on 
furlough over the last three years.  Now, they have been 
asked to work without pay for one week out of four until 
further notice, with no commitment that the pay will be 
made up.  “They say that we have cushy union jobs and 
benefits,” said Sandra Gallard, the head of the teachers’ 
local.  “That isn’t true, given the jobs and the conditions, 
but it certainly isn’t considering that often we aren’t 
being paid anyway.  And the stress, year after year, of not 
knowing whether you will have a job.  We have married 
couples where both teach, and they have children.  The 
city has nowhere else to save money.  They’re squeezing 
the firefighters and the police, too.”
Reported auto and home sales have fallen to near-zero 
levels, with financing essentially unavailable.  Practical 
fallout for families is painful, as people who cannot buy or 
sell homes cannot move to take new jobs, or cannot buy 
automobiles to get to work.  Meanwhile, even families not 
in need of new home or auto loans face rising payments 
on their existing variable-rate consumer loans, or cannot 
access new credit.  Martha Whitmarsh has watched her 
monthly payments on a credit line that she used to pay 
medical bills double in the last three months.  “And I have 
never missed a payment.  Until now,” she says, worriedly.
Ironically, economists and others who believed that 
default would eliminate a taxpayer burden – servicing the 
debt – now say that they are rethinking that assumption.  
They have discovered that the eliminated burden was 
essentially an income tax obligation on current and future 
taxpayers who now have significantly reduced incomes on 
which to pay those taxes in the first place.
Now, analysts are hoping that the President and his 
November election opponent can find an agreement 
that will restore functioning financial markets so that 
economic activity can resume.  The bitter battle of press 
releases continues, but exchanges of new legislative offers 
may resume this week.  The President, in a previously 
scheduled campaign event, called for calm, and appealed 
for patience on the part of holders of federal bonds that 
are overdue for redemption.
The standing of the United States around the world 
clearly has been shaken.  The Prime Minister of France, 
whose financial institutions have been hit by the failure 
of the federal government to redeem its securities, and 
whose economy is threatened as a result, has publicly 
called on the United States to address its fiscal problems.  
Perhaps most pointedly, the Prime Minister was 
overheard making a private, somewhat sarcastic reference 
to “old America.”
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Sunday, September 30, 2012.  The United States Treasury is scrambling to limit the impact of its surprising struggle to 
refinance the nation’s maturing debt last month.  Effects have been felt broadly and continue to spread.  Numerous 
businesses and banks have felt the repercussions, and the financial markets anxiously await signs that normal 
operations will resume.  The President and his November election opponent are being pressed on the campaign trail 
for a response to the crisis, but their reactions have been limited to mutual accusations of failure to bargain in good 
faith.
The Treasury was unprepared to react when the August 1 auction of securities, needed to roll over a large volume 
of maturing Treasury bills, notes and bonds, unexpectedly was far undersubscribed.  Market observers reported that 
buyers simply did not want to make commitments to government securities after the markets became increasingly 
convinced during the presidential election campaign that resolution of the federal budget crisis was likely years away.  
Without the cash needed to redeem the maturing securities, the Treasury turned to the Federal Reserve.  But the Fed, 
citing the need to maintain its reputation as the guardian of the currency, refused to intervene.
Emergency Government 
Cutbacks Continue
Treasury Attempts to Fund Social Security Payments;
Contractors Protest Repeal of “Prompt Payment” Law
Part 3.2.  Alternative Futures, 2012 –
Outright default is not the only potential outcome of a debt redemption crisis.   
The following is another – which is equally harrowing: 
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As a result, the Treasury has 
been scrambling to raise the cash 
to remain current on its debt 
redemptions ever since.  Even after 
the minimal expected safety margin 
of government cash balances was 
cut to the bone, further emergency 
measures have been needed.  In the 
end, the government avoided default 
on its bonds by raising cash through 
reneging on tens of billions of dollars 
of its obligations to contractors, 
employees, and program beneficiaries.
Hospitals and doctors have been 
among the first and most seriously 
affected.  Those providing services to 
the elderly through Medicare have 
had their payments delayed.  States 
waiting for federal grant payments 
to cover Medicaid reimbursements 
of doctors and hospitals have 
had to delay their payments as 
well.  Some healthcare providers 
have refused to participate in the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs 
until regular payment procedures are 
restored.  “I have watched Medicare 
reimbursements fall ever further 
below my costs for years,” said Jane 
Goodwell, a physician in Springfield, 
Illinois.  “I’ve been reluctant to accept 
new Medicare patients, but I have 
continued to do so because so few 
other doctors in the area have.  Now, 
not only am I reimbursed well below 
my costs, but I have to wait for the 
check.  I’m being asked personally 
to finance a federal government 
program.  It’s time to stop.”  
Goodwell’s hospital, Springfield 
Surgical Center, is torn between the 
reluctance of its practicing physicians 
to put up with Medicare’s new 
payment delays, and its need to keep 
its operating rooms utilized between 
more-lucrative patients with private 
Analysis.
Contributions from staff reporters in New York and Washington.
insurance.  On the other side of the 
figurative desk are newly Medicare-
eligible patients.  When asked if she 
has found a physician, Mary Biggs 
of Springfield says, “No, not yet.  The 
doctors of my friends on Medicare 
aren’t accepting patients anymore.  
They all say that the payment delays 
are the last straw.”
These delays in payments were made 
possible by a somewhat surprising 
but perhaps unwelcome act of 
bipartisanship.  The Congress voted 
to repeal the Prompt Payment Act, 
under which the federal government 
had previously been obligated to 
pay its accounts within set numbers 
of days of billing.  This has affected 
not only doctors and hospitals, 
but a wide range of government 
contractors.  Since then, contractors 
have received scrip rather than cash.  
Some small contractors already have 
gone out of business, because they 
have been unable to meet their own 
obligations.  David Michaelson 
of Desert Foods provides food to 
the cafeterias of the large Sandia 
national science laboratories near 
Albuquerque, New Mexico.  He says 
that the scrip payments are worthless 
to him.  “Some of my suppliers 
are from Mexico.  What do they 
want with U.S. government funny 
money?” he says.  “Others are large 
regional firms with headquarters 
states away.  The people I deal with 
can’t accept a handshake as payment, 
even though they know and trust 
me.”  Michaelson also says that the 
service he receives from his suppliers 
has deteriorated, because they prefer 
to deal with businesses that service 
private firms, simply because they 
are now more likely to pay on time.  
“Maybe the best thing that could 
happen for me would be for the 
economy to get so bad that even the 
private buyers can’t pay,” he says with 
an angry laugh.
As of the last federal government 
payday, which varies by agency, 
federal employees also have been 
paid in scrip rather than cash.  Many 
of the people who work at the 
Sandia lab are so affected.  Local 
governments and communities with 
heavy concentrations of government 
employees, some of which also have 
many government contractors, have 
been forced into “creative financing” 
arrangements because their 
populations are short of cash.  This 
creates enormous difficulties, because 
such scrip is not a fully secure or 
convenient medium of payment.  
Reports of “scrip counterfeiting” 
have been heard, but legal sanctions 
on perpetrators of such acts are not 
well established.  Meanwhile, small 
businesses are struggling because 
their suppliers almost universally 
do not accept such scrip, and 
bank lending is frozen because of 
the financial crisis.  For example, 
Michaelson of Desert Foods has tried 
to get a credit line from his bank, 
without success.  “They say they are 
worse off than I am,” he laments.
Surprisingly to some, even the 
American military has not been 
immune.  Servicemen and women 
have had their paychecks delayed.  
Military contractors have suffered 
the same prompt-payment stretch-
outs as suppliers to the civilian 
government.  Perhaps most painfully, 
physicians, nurses and other 
employees at veterans and military 
hospitals have had to work without 
pay for weeks.  As one doctor put 
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it, “I saw my career as a challenge, 
not a sacrifice, even though the pay 
was below the levels of the private 
sector.  I also believed that I was 
serving my country, even though 
my sacrifice was nothing compared 
with the young men and women I 
treat here.  But what does it tell you 
when there is no paycheck at all?  
My family is hurting, and the private 
surgeons I know think I’m a chump.”  
This doctor noted that his military 
hospital has had to stretch out its 
purchases of supplies.  “There haven’t 
been any tragedies.  Yet,” he reported.
Troops on base in the United States 
have had support from their own 
military institutions, but there may 
be limits.  Groceries and other 
goods and services are delivered 
by the private sector, and suppliers’ 
forbearance is wearing thin.  Troops 
overseas see less understanding from 
their surrounding communities.  
“Some people are always friendly, but 
generally we are tolerated because 
we have money to spend,” said one 
Army enlisted man.  “Now, we have 
no money to spend.  Draw your own 
conclusions.” 
The next test of the makeshift 
federal financing system will come 
tomorrow, when Social Security 
benefit payments are due.  Those 
payments should have been arranged 
last week, but the Treasury is still 
rushing to round up the necessary 
cash to authorize the deposits into 
beneficiaries’ bank accounts.  The 
symbolism of the struggle to make 
the high-profile Social Security 
payment, not to mention the 
possible dislocation for elderly and 
disabled beneficiaries, has not been 
lost on the public.  Some interest 
groups who have insisted that 
Social Security is safe because of the 
putative balance in the program’s 
trust fund have been working to 
explain to their constituencies how 
the lack of cash in the Treasury’s 
general fund has rendered their past 
claims inoperative.  Social Security 
Administration spokesmen explain 
that the program is governed by 
the same Antideficiency Act that 
applies to all other agencies, and if 
the federal government does not have 
cash, it cannot write checks.  
Cashing in the trust fund’s securities 
technically reduces the debt, but the 
law is unclear as to the permissible 
timing for redeeming the trust fund’s 
“special securities” for cash, relative 
to actually paying the benefits.  In an 
even more bizarre legal conflict, the 
law provides no guidance as to who 
should be paid first if the Treasury 
is short of money.  The Treasury, for 
simplicity, has followed a first-in-
first-out rule.  So with unpaid bills at 
the head of the line, cash raised for 
Social Security technically should 
be used to pay those non-Social 
Security bills first.  Legal battles over 
any government decisions could tie 
the federal paymaster’s operation in 
knots.
The uncertainty regarding Social 
Security has had enormous adverse 
consequences, and not all are based 
on the facts of the situation.  Rumors 
have spread, despite the best efforts 
of the Social Security Administration 
to maintain calm with sound 
information – although, in fact, 
those efforts have been hindered 
by the inability of Social Security 
to make financial commitments for 
advertising and mailings because of 
the debt crisis.  Still, volunteer groups 
find that misinformation spreads 
faster than the truth – over the 
Internet, and through old-fashioned 
conversation.  Mary Rogers of 
Sarasota, Florida, has seen the effects. 
“My neighbors are so upset,” she 
reports.  “I’ve spoken with relatives 
who have researched the situation, 
and told me when the checks are 
likely to be paid.  But some of my 
older friends don’t have family 
support, and they believe everything 
they hear.  They spread it around, and 
the story gets more inaccurate with 
each telling.  And then there are the 
salesmen who promise to get your 
benefit paid if you pay them an up-
front fee.  A couple down the block 
fell for that scam.  It’s disgraceful.”
Alongside the rumors surrounding 
Social Security are further rumors 
of an emergency income tax 
surcharge to raise cash for the federal 
government.  Although no legislation 
has yet been introduced, reports 
indicate that both the Administration 
and the tax writing committees of 
the Congress have asked the Internal 
Revenue Service to consider design 
issues.  One possibility reportedly is 
mandatory 10 percent increases in 
wage withholding, and mandatory 10 
percent withholding on all interest 
and dividend payments and securities 
transactions, without changes in the 
actual tax owed – in effect a required 
interest-free loan from all wage 
earners and financial asset owners 
to the federal government.  Another 
option is reported to be an actual 
income tax surcharge to accompany 
the new and increased withholding.
The standing of the United States 
around the world clearly has 
fallen.  As one example, although 
the Chinese government’s official 
statements have been polite, 
government subordinates – with 
apparent backing from their 
superiors – have spoken caustically 
with reporters, making frequent and 
seemingly scripted references to “the 
world’s supposed financial leader.”
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The two previous potential futures assumed that the Treasury turned to the 
Federal Reserve for a rescue, but the Fed refused.  It is far from clear that the 
prospects would be any better if the Fed capitulated, as the following describes:
“Stagflation” Returns
Economic Plague of the 1970s,
Thought to be Long Gone,
Is Back With a Vengeance
Sunday, May 18, 2014.  Although economists sometimes 
vie with weather forecasters as objects of public ridicule, a 
long-standing truism of the dismal science has been that 
the economy might suffer slow growth or high inflation, 
but that it would not be subject to both at the same time.  
For a time in the 1970s, that truism proved false, in several 
years of what was then called “stagflation.”  After the 
recession of the early 1980s broke the back of inflation, 
stagflation disappeared, and the age-old economic 
truism enjoyed a popular rehabilitation.  Now, however, 
stagflation is back with a vengeance, and many trace its 
resurrection to the decision of the Federal Reserve to stave 
off default by purchasing Treasury securities when private 
investors refused to support an auction to roll over the 
maturing debt almost two years ago. 
Analysis.
Contributions from staff reporters in New 
York and Washington.
At that time, the Treasury turned to the Federal Reserve, 
which bought up excess securities despite reported 
significant internal dissent over the risk to its credibility 
in the international financial markets.
Financial markets reacted adversely, driving the dollar 
down.  Some economists and other analysts had argued 
in recent years that such Federal Reserve intervention 
would calm the markets for Treasury securities, on the 
ground that guaranteed Fed purchases would assure 
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successful future auctions.  These economists had 
concluded that “deficits don’t matter,” and advocated that 
the federal government ignore its budget deficits and 
the projected long-run shortfalls in Social Security and 
Medicare.  However, once the financial markets decided 
that the deficit would not be addressed for several years, 
and that massive government borrowing would continue 
unabated, interest rates on Treasury securities spiked.  
Federal Reserve officials found again – as they had in 
previous episodes of rising interest rates, including the 
late 1990s and early 2000s – that they could not move the 
markets when sentiment was so strong.
The Fed has direct control over only short-term interest 
rates, and when the markets themselves drive the more 
economically important longer-term rates higher through 
a lack of demand for those securities, the Fed’s tools have 
no immediate effect.
The Treasury’s securities were already issued mostly 
with short maturities.  Official spokesmen say that the 
short-term maturity of the debt has been unavoidable, 
because those were the securities that the market wanted 
to buy.  However, as investors become increasingly risk 
averse because of the more rapid inflation, the maturity 
structure has become shorter still.  This puts the Treasury 
on an accelerating treadmill, as increasing inflation drives 
investors even more toward shorter-term securities, 
and interest rates rise continually.  Increases in the 
costs of everything the federal government does – from 
automatically indexed benefit payments to the prices of 
supplies for the military – will send the deficit higher, 
compounding the effect of higher interest rates.  So the 
cost of servicing the federal debt accelerates upward.
For a time, the Fed tried to counteract this effect by 
buying longer-term securities – for the first time since the 
financial crisis of 2008 through 2011 – in an attempt to 
hold rates down.
But inflation continued to drift higher, pushed by 
higher costs of imports and the Fed’s own feared loss of 
credibility both on international markets and at home.  
As a result, the credit markets continued to push rates 
upward.  Large numbers of sophisticated market players 
bet that the Fed could not maintain its purchases of 
tens of billions of dollars of long-term bonds, and the 
Fed quickly had to capitulate.  As one market player 
commented, “Sure, we had heard the theories of a few 
economists that the Fed has total control of interest rates.  
But the entire market was convinced otherwise.  Those 
theories were just blown away like dead leaves in an early 
winter storm.”
As a result, analysts say, commerce has been crippled 
from a double whammy.  Higher long-term interest 
rates – even relative to the faster inflation – have shackled 
business investment, for everything from sophisticated 
plant and equipment to the prosaic financing of 
inventories.  Moreover, the lack of credit for consumers 
to purchase new homes and automobiles has reduced the 
demand for such investment in the first place.
So far, the actions of the Federal Reserve to restrain 
prices have been less successful than anticipated.  Some 
believe that the Fed actions raise concerns among foreign 
investors of a significant U.S. economic slowdown.  That 
would make servicing U.S. debt even more difficult, and 
so foreign investors have driven down the value of the 
dollar along with the values of U.S. securities – at a pace 
that appears to be accelerating.  This raises the prices of 
imported goods, thus fighting against the Fed in its anti-
inflationary program.
Economists say that talk of inflation because of Federal 
Reserve money creation has become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  Businesses have been forced to raise prices 
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to cover the rising costs of servicing their debt.  Many 
businesses have short-term market financing that must be 
rolled over continuously, or have bank loans at adjustable 
rates.  Businesses that purchase imports to produce their 
products or operate their businesses are hit even harder, 
because of the rapid decline of the dollar.  Consumers are 
pinched as well by the rising prices of imports, meaning 
that businesses are caught between the increase in costs 
and the decline of sales.  
One adversely affected business is Highway Imports 
of Richmond, Virginia, which sells Korean cars.  “The 
factory tried to hold the line on U.S. prices for some 
time, but after a while that just wasn’t possible,” said 
Jim Hartman, who owns the dealership.  “Our cars 
are the most economical on the market, including fuel 
efficiency as well as purchase price.  Having the dollar 
fall by half makes competing very difficult.”  The business 
news across town, at a dealership family selling both 
Ford and General Motors called All-American Cars, is 
very different.  “Because the imports have to deal with 
the drop in the dollar, we have been able to take some 
market share – although total sales haven’t risen as much 
as we’d like, given the unemployment,” reported Tom 
Brown, the sales manager.  But he reports that dealers 
for domestic cars are not competing vigorously on price.  
“Look, with the inflation, manufacturing costs here are 
going up,” he explains.  “All of the imported components 
of the domestic cars, from steel to little bits of hardware 
to all sorts of things, have risen even more.  So we can’t 
hold our prices down.  And with the import dealers in 
even worse shape and raising their prices plenty, we can 
allow our prices to rise just a little bit less and still have a 
competitive advantage.”
Some businesses report that they have fixed-dollar sales 
contracts that prevent them from raising prices even 
while their costs are rising and slack consumer demand 
makes it hard to increase sales.  Many such businesses 
have been forced to declare bankruptcy, or even to 
close their doors.  One such victim was Rapid Air, a 
manufacturer of filters for the auto industry based in 
Michigan.  The firm was one of the survivors of the auto 
bankruptcies of the late 2000s, because it was noted for 
its efficiency.  When sales picked up modestly, Rapid Air 
capitalized on its position to negotiate what its owner, 
Ray Webberly, thought would be a secure contract 
with some of the divisions of the big three automakers.  
Instead, he says, “I walked into a vise.  Some of my 
workforce is unionized, so they have a pay escalator 
clause.  I had always given comparable pay raises to the 
non-union workers.  But my prices rise only at the rate 
I had negotiated, which I thought was generous.  The 
car builders had the right to cut purchases somewhat, 
and sales have been slow.  And as inflation zoomed, I 
couldn’t pay the bills.  I had to declare bankruptcy to try 
to keep the business going.”  But because of difficulty 
renegotiating contracts with his customers, Webberly says 
that his family-owned business is likely to close its doors 
for good at the end of the month.
In the longer term, economists express concern about 
a lessened incentive to save.  Rising prices reduce the 
value of accumulated savings, and anticipation of future 
inflation makes buying now seem more attractive.  After 
years of preaching to the American people that they 
should save more to build a stronger economy for the 
future, our nation’s leaders now may find that such advice 
swims against a strong tide.  “I don’t know why I bothered 
to save at all,” said James Gladwell, who retired near his 
former factory job in Indianapolis, Indiana.  Gladwell 
spent most of his career at firms that offered 401(k) 
plans, and he always put aside at least a small part of his 
paycheck.  “But the stock market has done poorly, and 
when I get my withdrawal check every month it buys less 
and less.  Social Security will go up, someday, but this 
retirement check will buy me nothing before long.”
Thus, a weak U.S. economy has none the less been visited 
by rapid inflation.  Many market observers say that the 
credibility of the Federal Reserve as the defender of the 
value of the dollar has been called seriously into question.  
Increasing purchases of euros, yen and renminbi by oil-
producing and money-center nations have shaken the 
privileged position of the dollar as the world’s reserve 
currency, at least in relative terms.  Market players fear 
that if the aura of the dollar is tarnished much further, 
remaining stores of dollars could be dumped onto the 
market, resulting in even sharper downward pressure on 
the greenback’s value.  Either the European Union or 
China, these financial observers say, could step forward as 
alternative financial and commercial centers.  Each carries 
its own financial baggage, experts admit, but the dollar’s 
precipitous fall from grace seems still to have considerable 
momentum – perhaps leaving even these untested 
currencies as viable alternatives.
Economists say that prospects for an economic 
turnaround will not improve until the federal government 
achieves a firm grip on its finances.  But they add that the 
bankruptcies of many businesses in the last six months 
have imposed a cost on the economy that cannot be 
recovered.
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Why Slower Wage 
Growth?
Incomes Have Turned Sluggish for a Decade;
Economists, Politicians Worry
Even apart from a return of stagflation, excessive budget deficits can reduce standards of living, as 
the following alternative future explains.
Sunday, May 20, 2018.  Data on wages across the 
economy are among the slowest-moving indicators of 
progress.  Interpreting the numbers is complex, not only 
because they change slowly, but also because changes 
in the underlying structure of the economy – including 
the numbers of different types of businesses, employing 
workers with different skills, in different jobs – confuse 
the picture.  However, economists are coming to conclude 
from the figures of the last decade that wage growth has 
slowed significantly, which if true will have unhappy 
consequences for generations of Americans.
Following on the financial panic of 2007-2009, and 
through the last eight years in which the economy has 
Part 3.4.  Alternative Futures, 2018 –
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apparently recovered and expanded, wages have increased 
markedly less than in economic upswings in the past.  
Economists now surmise that the wage slowdown is 
not caused by the tepid pace of the economic recovery.  
The labor market regained what most would call full 
employment almost three years ago, but the trend of 
wages since has remained sluggish. 
Analysis.
Contributions from staff reporters in New 
York and Washington.
Some economists argue that the slow growth of wages is 
not surprising, given that investment has grown slowly as 
well.  Workers are generally believed to be paid according 
to their productivity, and more investment, including 
both modernization and giving workers more machines, 
computers, and other equipment with which to work, 
is thought to make workers more productive.  The data 
indicate that this pattern has held true.  Thus, with 
investment slow, productivity growth has been slow, and 
wage growth has been slow as well.
Another pattern that has followed the tenets of economic 
theory is that the wage slowdown has coincided with 
a period of large federal government budget deficits.  
Economists generally believe that large budget deficits 
drain the capital that would otherwise be available for 
business, thereby slowing productivity growth and wage 
growth.
Those same economists have warned that large deficits 
could create a financial meltdown, with a sudden spike 
in interest rates and a sharp drop in the value of the 
dollar.  Because that has not happened, other economists 
and many politicians have concluded that “deficits don’t 
matter.”  As a result, the popular clamor for deficit 
reduction that seemed so strong in the early part of the 
decade has seemed to die down.
But budget hawks argue that the absence of a financial 
explosion does not disprove the existence of a slow and 
dangerous burn.  They contend that the sudden meltdown 
has been prevented by two forces, neither of which 
improves the prospects for longer-term continuing wage 
growth.
The first benign force cited by these economists has 
been that markets have remained tepid, largely because 
recurring economic weakness and financial instability 
around the world have maintained the dollar’s status as 
a “safe haven.”  We remain “the best looking horse in 
the glue factory,” as one economist3 put it.   Meanwhile, 
however, the federal government has continued to 
accumulate more debt, raising the prospect of a later but 
even worse debt meltdown.
Implementing this levitation of Treasury bond prices 
has been the increasingly common practice of banks and 
other financial institutions to accept deposits from the 
public at low interest rates and then invest those deposits 
in Treasury securities.  The Treasury bills, notes and 
bonds have had comparatively low yields, but they also 
involve little risk, and purchasing them in large quantities 
involves little cost.  So this strategy has enabled banks to 
earn modest but sure profits, and has helped the Treasury 
to finance the public debt.  But the bank deposits that 
have been recycled into Treasury securities have not been 
available for lending to prospective homeowners, auto 
buyers, or small business entrepreneurs.  This process 
is a clear demonstration of what economists call the 
“crowding out” of private investment by government 
budget deficits.
The second force has been a series of limited efforts 
by successive Presidents and Congresses to reduce the 
budget deficit.  Episodic bursts of bad news on the 
budget have resulted in partial, ineffective responses – 
never enough to lay the problem to rest.  Then, periods of 
good news – a few quarters of above-forecast economic 
growth, and smaller-than-expected deficits – have led 
policymakers back to complacency and recidivism.  
Experts say that none of the budget agreements of the 
past decade has come close to solving the problem.  
However, by nibbling away, policymakers have managed 
to fend off an out-and-out crisis.
But some economists say that the large deficits have in 
turn nibbled away at investment by business, and slow 
wage growth has been one of the by-products.  Among 
economists who deny the primary role of budget deficits, 
there are two competing interpretations of the cause of 
the slower growth.  More-conservative economists argue 
that the tax increases that have helped to keep the budget 
problem from getting totally out of hand have been 
enough to dull incentives to invest and work.  Others 
policy observers from the liberal end of the spectrum 
argue that the tax increases have been too small to reduce 
incentives, but that reductions in the government’s annual 
appropriations have restricted crucial public investment, 
3 This comment was actually made by Nariman Behravesh at CED’s first hearing.
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including for infrastructure, new technologies such as 
clean energy, and even defense modernization.  The 
middle-of-the-road economists say that quicker deficit 
reduction, before the debt and debt-service costs grew 
so large, could have limited the debt and the necessary 
actions on both taxes and spending, thereby heading 
off the concerns from all parts of the political spectrum.  
Meanwhile, they cite the phenomenon of crowding out of 
private investment as a cause of sluggish growth of both 
wages and the total output of the economy.
Sluggish wages have had adverse consequences beyond 
limiting the incomes of consumers, and frustrating them 
with lower standards of living.  The financial status of 
Social Security and Medicare has been downgraded 
repeatedly – not so much because their costs have 
exceeded expectations, but rather because revenues have 
fallen short.  The official actuary has warned that action 
will be needed soon to restore their long-term financial 
balance.  Of course, either higher taxes or lower benefits 
will merely compound the direct effect of slow wage 
growth on standards of living.  Furthermore, uncertainty 
because of multiple changes to retirement programs has 
demoralized the elderly and their adult children, and 
reduced economic confidence generally.
Beyond the immediate economic consequences, sluggish 
growth in the United States is said by some to have 
reduced the nation’s standing around the world.  The 
image of the United States as a dynamic country on the 
cutting edge of technology and innovation has faded.  
Foreign policy decisions are increasingly cramped by 
concern about the reaction of our creditor nations, with 
growing shares of the public debt owned by overseas 
investors and governments.  Limited budgets for defense 
and foreign aid have worsened the problem.  As China’s 
GDP has first equaled and then surpassed by a growing 
margin that of the United States, esteem for this nation 
overseas has sagged.  Despite periods of tension, foreign 
lenders have continued over time to buy Treasury 
securities – with the result that the public debt continues 
to grow, raising the stakes for any future crisis.
Even as other nations have grown more prosperous 
over the years since World War II, the United States 
maintained the aura of a leader.  If the current slowdown 
in wage growth continues, foreign policy experts fear that 
the recent apparent beginning of the erosion of American 
leadership could continue and accelerate.  Many experts 
cite the role of budget deficits in that erosion.  “I doubt 
that I would complain to my local banker that his lawn 
looked a little shaggy if I were late on my loan payments,” 
mused one scholar.
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It would be politically difficult and painful for our elected leaders to scramble their way out of the 
kind of budgetary hole described prospectively at the outset of this statement.  Here is one way in 
which it might happen.
A Narrow Escape
Markets Warned Political Leaders;
Why Were We So Lucky?
Tuesday, October 23, 2012.  A measure 
of calm has returned to international 
financial markets today, after the 
United States Treasury’s surprising 
struggle to refinance the nation’s 
large maturing debt two months 
ago.  Market participants say that 
the repercussions may be contained 
by the limited deficit-reduction 
agreement agreed upon by both 
parties yesterday, and the financial 
markets anxiously await further signs 
that normal operations will resume.  
The President and his election 
opponent plan to return to the 
campaign trail today, after breaking 
off for their emergency negotiations 
late last week.
The Treasury was unprepared to 
react when the August 1 auction 
of securities, needed to roll over 
maturing Treasury bills, notes 
and bonds, unexpectedly was 
far undersubscribed by investors 
who were unnerved by the two 
presidential candidates’ apparent 
indifference over the federal budget 
crisis.  As the Treasury scrambled 
to find the cash that was necessary 
to refund the debt, the international 
financial markets sent a strong signal 
to the candidates, as the dollar fell 
sharply and market interest rates on 
Treasury securities jumped.  Still, the 
markets apparently were willing to 
give Washington some limited space 
in which to maneuver, in the opinion 
of some observers because investment 
alternatives elsewhere around the 
world appeared unsatisfactory.  
Market movements after the first 
24 hours continued adverse, but 
remained short of outright panic. 
Part 3.5. Alternative Futures, 2012 –
Analysis.
Contributions from staff reporters in New York and 
Washington.
Then, market participants said that they were not satisfied when the 
presidential candidates and Congressional leaders met briefly last week, 
calling the result pure public posturing.  After the talks were interrupted, 
the financial markets, which previously had relented based on a 
presumption that the United States would address its problems, spiked 
again, but even more sharply.  The candidates and the Congressional 
leadership began to meet again, but pressure continued to build, and the 
perception became even stronger that they had no choice but to come to 
agreement.
Reports indicated that the meetings in the Capitol were highly 
contentious.  Each side argued that the other would be blamed if  
failure led to another market paroxysm.  But participants in the  
meetings reported a palpable sense that failure to reach an agreement 
could have unspeakable consequences.
News of the agreement yesterday has apparently calmed investors, 
as European markets at the opening showed meaningful gains after 
the days of wild fluctuations and large losses.  Economists expressed 
confidence that success in implementing the agreement will facilitate 
a resumption of credit market activity for businesses and consumers, 
limiting the fears of the last weeks and re-charging the stumbling 
economic recovery.  Statements by well placed officials near the Federal 
Reserve suggest that the Fed will hold interest rates down to keep 
the economy moving while government spending is cut and taxes are 
increased.
Implications for the election campaign are not clear, according to 
political experts.  The President’s team members are saying quietly that 
the achievement of an agreement will take the issues of a weak economy 
and panicky financial markets, which they had considered major 
electoral liabilities, off the table.  They are unsure, however, whether 
claiming a political victory through taking the economy to the brink 
of disaster would be seemly, as well as whether it might threaten the 
ultimate legislative implementation of the deal in this charged political 
environment.  The campaign leaders of the opposition candidate, in 
contrast, have begun touting more explicitly the candidate’s leadership in 
pushing the negotiations to a successful conclusion.
As calm is returning, market players expressed relief, but described 
the outcome as a fortunate escape.  Global markets had sent strong 
signals to Washington, but somehow held back from the worst crash, 
as if collectively attempting to convince – or compel – policymakers 
to respond.  As one expert asked, shaking his head in relief and 
wonderment, “Why did the financial markets give our political leaders 
a second chance?  And what would have happened if they had not?”  
Other market players express intense interest in the answer to the first 
question, but do not want to know the answer to the second.
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Part 4. Conclusion: A Better Way?
None of these alternative futures look particularly encouraging.  Is there a better way?
Through the power of word processing, let us rewind these futures back to the present – before the 
stage-setting that we saw in Part 2, above.  Starting all over, could we see a better future unfold?
Budget Agreement 
Reached
Above Politics?
How President and Congress
Turned the Finances Around
Sunday, September 11, 2011.  When the President and 
the congressional leadership announced very early this 
morning that they had reached an agreement on a long-
term, phased-in deficit reduction program, combined 
with a temporary stimulus to boost the tepid economy 
over the next year, both political and financial observers 
combined sighs of relief with looks of wonder.
Economists and Washington insiders alike were pleased 
at the success, but surprised as well – even though the 
talks had been ongoing for more than two weeks.  “I 
said I would believe it when I see it,” said Norman 
Ornerystein of the American Enterprise Institute after 
the public announcement of the agreement.  “But right 
now, I’m not sure if that is true.”  Thomas Manners, 
another veteran watcher of Washington politics at the 
Brookings Institution, noted that this budget deal was 
the quickest to come to fruition in modern history.  He 
pointed out, however, that budget agreements seldom 
have been the products of laborious research.  “People 
know the issues walking in the door,” he said.  “What 
takes the time is not discovering the options, it’s the 
players making up their minds to get to ‘yes’ and choose 
among them.  This one clearly was urgent – heck, we have 
a genuine economic emergency out there – but even so, 
it is shocking, in a good sense, that these parties could 
overcome all of the partisan conflict that we have seen for 
so long.”  Another Washington watcher, political scientist, 
humorist and cartoonist James Thurber, announced 
immediately that he was working on a book about the 
budget deal, tentatively entitled, “The Night The Jaws 
Fell.”
Reactions from Wall Street managers were similarly 
surprised, and almost euphoric.  One trader, who wished 
to remain anonymous to protect the identity of his firm, 
is typical.  “It is totally unreal,” he said when he heard 
of the agreement last night.  “The world has changed 
completely.”  He noted that the markets had begun to 
react positively as the talks had shown progress, but 
remained reserved because of the perceived likelihood 
of a political failure.  “This changes everything,” he 
concluded.  “The sky is the limit for the stock and bond 
markets tomorrow.”
But the remarkable turnaround in policy and 
policymaking in Washington left insiders asking how 
it happened.  At least one reached a conclusion last 
night.  “Look, I’ve been knocked around in many budget 
negotiations over the years,” said Leon E. Piñata, former 
White House budget director and chief of staff, and also 
a former House Budget Committee chairman.  “And 
one thing I’ve learned is that this country addresses its 
problems either in crisis or through leadership.  This time, 
two people realized that if you want to call yourself a 
leader, once or twice you have to go first.” 
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Analysis.
Contributions from staff reporters in New 
York and Washington.
The developments that led here, in retrospect, probably 
were more likely to yield tragedy than triumph.  For 
almost a century, the United States has been a constant 
in global finance and business.  Even in the financial 
meltdown of 2007-2009, U.S. Treasury securities were 
perceived as a safe haven for investors, a destination for a 
“flight to quality.”  But over the last year, events began to 
shake those perceptions of the United States as bedrock 
for investors.  These changes had roots in the earlier 
financial crisis, and even before.
In the early years of this century, the United States lost 
its budget surplus and so started to accumulate debt.  
Even before the financial crisis that began in 2007-2008, 
this higher debt aroused worry in the financial markets.  
But in the crisis itself, while developed countries around 
the world found themselves in recession and with weak 
budgets, the United States added more debt than most.
There was a period of grace for this country.  The extreme 
financial woes of some of the weakest nations, epitomized 
by Greece, attracted most attention.  The status of the 
dollar as the world’s reserve currency provided some 
insulation from our own troubles, as other countries 
and companies parked their money by buying up our 
debt. And investors all around the world began from the 
assumption that at the end of the day, the United States 
would face up to its problems and do what it had to do.
But whatever grace the nation had enjoyed began to 
erode rapidly in the past two years.  The U.S. economy 
finally showed signs of finding its feet.  Growth resumed 
in late 2009.  Employment stopped falling, and began to 
turn around – although not yet with the rapid rebound 
that had followed the deepest previous recessions of the 
post-World War II era.  After nerve-wracking hesitation 
and uncertainty, the financial crisis in Greece was 
forestalled by cooperative action of the European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund, seeming to halt a 
possible contagion to other weak European states.  With 
considerable excess productive capacity in the United 
States, and also around the world, because of the tepid 
global recovery – in part because the reach of the financial 
crisis into Europe weakened the economic outlook there 
– inflation, which had been feared by many because of 
the extraordinary anti-recessionary financial measures 
undertaken by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, 
never became an issue.  America and the world took the 
time for a sigh of relief.
Still, to the public at large, the nation’s climbing debt 
levels in the wake of the financial crisis were vaguely 
disquieting.  After the plunging home values and under-
water mortgages that set off the crisis and the fallout 
for retirees, typical working people reacted adversely 
to the notion of rising debt, especially as it weighed 
on their plans for retirement and on their legacies for 
their children.  The notion of rising public debt seemed 
less immediately pressing than the private debt of their 
households.  Most people were less than familiar with 
the history of debt crises elsewhere around the world.  
Greece had given people some image of what government 
irresponsibility could do, though they correctly 
recognized that the United States and Greece were in 
almost all respects quite different.
The mid-term election of 2010 yielded large-scale 
change in the Congress.  The two parties, as was their 
wont, pointed fingers at each other over the budget and 
every other issue.  For the voters, there was a typical 
sentiment that those in office “owned” the economy and 
the budget; sophisticated analysis of who had been right, 
who had been wrong, and who was responsible did not 
capture the public imagination.  The result was a “throw-
the-bums-out” election of proportions comparable to 
the strongest in history.  The nation was left with a 
divided government, because the party in power was not 
successful in defending its many vulnerable seats; but 
some incumbents of the minority party suffered too.  So 
with the major reshuffling of the Congress beginning in 
2011, there was no chance for either party to dictate a 
legislative agenda before the next presidential election in 
2012.  Gridlock followed.
The modest upturn in the economy continued.  The 
president and his party claimed that this modest 
improvement indicated that they had been right all along, 
and that the country was finally seeing the fruits of the 
policies of the past two years.  The opposition countered 
that their new strength in the Congress, stalling the 
Administration’s agenda, caused the economic growth.
The public debt itself seemed to recede, slightly, as an 
economic issue.  With modest economic recovery came 
some limited but visible relief from the large deficits.  The 
sense of comfort was fed by continued low interest rates.  
With inflation remaining quiescent, interest rates rose 
little.  So although the public debt rose, the cost of debt 
service in the budget hardly budged.  There seemed to 
be little need to forgo spending, or raise taxes, because of 
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the higher debt.  Thus, continuing large budget deficits 
seemed almost benign.  Talk of “deficits don’t matter” 
even began to return:  Deficit alarmists had been crying 
“wolf ” for years, and the problem never materialized; the 
alarmists had been wrong before; so surely they would 
be wrong again.  There remained a sense of American 
exceptionalism: that “it can’t happen here.” 
The danger signs in the financial markets came 
surprisingly quickly.
With politics returned briefly to usual, the budget deficit 
smoldered in the background.  The budget outlook at the 
beginning of the year had the deficit down from its peak 
of 2009 but still much higher than would be sustainable, 
and then rising into the future.  To avoid offending the 
voters, the President made no painful decisions in his 
budget.  The President’s “fiscal responsibility commission” 
had failed to reach a bipartisan agreement, and even 
though it had presented a menu of ideas judged to be 
balanced and sound by nonpartisan experts, it had been 
largely ignored.  Some of those ideas were included in the 
President’s subsequent budget, but that budget was “dead 
on arrival,” in the language of Capitol Hill.
When the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office 
evaluated that budget, it projected resulting deficits 
significantly higher than claimed by the President 
himself.  The opposition in the Congress was not required 
to present a formal budget, of course, and so their 
informal alternatives could not be subjected to detailed 
analysis.  However, to appear no less attractive to the 
voters, they discussed even less by way of specific steps to 
cut spending, and of course pledged never to raise taxes.
It was at this point that budget experts in the policy 
community began to repeat more loudly the unavoidable 
conclusion, which in truth they had believed for some 
time:  Neither party was positioned to take any significant 
steps on the budget for years.  With this realization began 
the deterioration of global confidence that the United 
States eventually would face up to and solve its fiscal 
problems.
Meanwhile, ostensibly positive developments from 
overseas made the U.S. picture even more troubling.  
The apparent at least partial success of budgetary 
retrenchment in Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain and Ireland 
made their debt sell more freely on financial markets.  
With the lessened threat to the European banks that 
held much of their debt, and to the rescue program 
that had been assembled by the European Union and 
the International Monetary Fund, the markets sent the 
euro up.  At the same time, China’s signs of steadying 
maturity in the international financial community raised 
anticipation of a floating, and more valuable, Chinese 
currency.
On the surface, the stabilization in Europe and China 
was in turn a relief for the U.S. economy.  The fear of 
European economic and financial collapse had put a 
damper on U.S. markets, and that in turn made both 
consumers and businesses more cautious.  Weaker 
consumer demand yielded weaker business investment, 
which fed back into consumer demand in a vicious cycle.  
Now, that restraint seemed to fade.  And a more mature 
Chinese market economy would be more predictable.
But the supreme irony was that such good news carried 
bad news.  With apparent economic recovery, central 
banks around the world, including the Federal Reserve, 
accelerated their programs of raising interest rates 
from what had been low, stimulative levels toward their 
historical norms.  Though the accumulation of U.S. 
public debt thus far had seemed benign because of the 
extraordinarily low interest rates, the debt had grown 
so large that even a move toward normal rates quickly 
made the debt-service cost problematic.  And as the 
euro and the renminbi became more attractive, naturally 
enough, the dollar began to fall relative to them, and U.S. 
securities became less attractive to foreign investors.
So slowly at first, but then at an accelerating pace, higher 
budget deficits and the reduced political prospect that 
they would be addressed frightened investors, who raised 
interest rates, which made the budget deficit worse.  This 
basic adverse feedback loop was further worsened by the 
impact of this development on the rest of the economy.  
Consumers were just working their way above the surface 
from their under-water mortgages, and broader economic 
growth raised the prospect of the first healthy demand 
for housing in years; but rising interest rates slowed 
that process.  Businesses newly interested in investment 
suddenly faced rising borrowing costs, which threatened 
that component of growth.  State and local governments 
had been squeezed by the economic slowdown and the 
tepid recovery, and rising interest rates put a chill on their 
plans just as the very first signs of meaningful economic 
growth gave some reason for hope.  So the federal budget 
clearly would be worsened by the direct impact of rising 
interest rates, but as the rising interest rates slowed the 
economy, the budget would be worsened still more.
	 Sunday,	September	11,	2011	 29
The rest of the world began to react to this adverse 
feedback loop.  Some years before, the petroleum-
producing countries of the Middle East had spoken 
privately about changing the peg of the oil price from 
dollars to a currency index or “basket,” or even to some 
other currency, and rumors of those conversations spread 
and raised doubts about the dollar.  But in the financial 
crisis and its aftermath, with the European economies 
so weak and the Chinese currency held artificially low, 
those Mid-East discussions ceased.  Now, with the rise 
of potential alternatives to the dollar, discussions of a 
successor to the dollar for pricing oil began again.
And on another front, the adverse U.S. political prospects 
for budget action along with the rising deficit forecasts 
raised the volume level of discussions by bond-rating 
agencies of a potential downgrade of U.S. Treasury 
securities.  In a concrete sense, these rating downgrades 
would have had little practical consequence, because 
Treasury securities would continue to be sold at auction 
– rather than being placed starting at estimated market 
rates, like all other U.S. debt securities.  However, just 
the talk of a rating downgrade led foreign governments 
that held much of their reserves in dollar-denominated 
securities, but which had previously deliberated privately 
about changing their investment decisions, to begin 
actually to shift their purchases slowly toward the yen, 
the euro, and even the renminbi, to give their portfolios 
some measure of diversification.  These shifts were 
unannounced, but close watchers of the Treasury market 
detected the movements and reported on them.  The news 
moved quickly from the computer worksheets in the back 
offices of the financial industry into the popular press.  
The psychological impact on investors began to build 
discernibly.
These early warning signs – in both the financial markets 
and the “real” indicators of employment and production 
– were not qualitatively different from the flashing red 
lights of the last decade.  Some might even argue that 
those red lights had been flashing for 30 years, with some 
brief periods of respite along the way.  The warnings 
might have been ignored, as they had on most occasions 
in the past.  However, experts consulted over the last two 
weeks have cited two differences.
First, as the budget and debt problems have accumulated, 
the warning signs have become stronger and more 
broadly based.  So having adverse comment about U.S. 
fiscal behavior echoed from the bond-rating agencies to 
the oil-producing countries to the stock market made 
these concerns more immediate and harder to ignore.
And second, and in a sharp departure from earlier 
years, the U.S. business community began to speak out.  
Business leaders had been reluctant to “raise their heads 
out of the foxhole,” as one put it in a not-for-attribution 
interview, after all of the adverse publicity of the Enron-
WorldCom management scandals of the 1990s, and 
then the financial meltdown and scandals of the decade 
of the 2000s.  But perhaps because of the realization 
that there was so much at stake, for their businesses 
and for their children and grandchildren, businessmen 
and women began to speak out.  The “shock value” of a 
business voice after years of silence on public issues did 
garner attention.  But perhaps more important was the 
open acknowledgment that a fair solution to the budget 
crisis would require sacrifice on all sides – including from 
themselves – which gave the business message additional 
credibility.
Whatever motivated the President, he reportedly 
determined in his own mind that the budget crisis had 
risen to a level far above politics, with the potential 
of catastrophic economic consequences.  Privately, he 
reached out to an opposition leader in the Congress to 
propose serious discussions to lead to a resolution of the 
crisis to be completed early – well before the presidential 
election, and before the nascent financial-market reaction 
could build dangerous momentum.  A few White 
House and Congressional staff members – all of whom 
demand anonymity – maintain that the President and 
this political opponent had spoken privately over several 
months.  The reports indicate that both had agreed on 
the seriousness of the problem, and that they would 
be willing to raise their conversations to the level of a 
substantive negotiation if the risk to the economy became 
real.  Three months ago, the President concluded that 
the risk had escalated, and with the agreement of the 
opposition leader, the private talks began.
In the initial one-on-one negotiation, the President 
and his political opponent decided in substantial part 
to go back to the ideas in the report of the President’s 
bipartisan commission (though that report had not 
received the necessary super-majority approval at the 
time).  However, those proposals needed to be modified 
to achieve bipartisan agreement in this changed 
environment.  This one-on-one negotiation could not 
go far, because as Washington insiders know, no one 
person can speak for even one party in the Congress.  
As the foundation for a bipartisan agreement was built 
and the talks broadened, a few more members of the 
Congressional opposition, and then members of the 
President’s party, were drawn in.  Because even a meeting 
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of one person in Washington never remains a secret for 
long, news of the talks soon came out.
The legendary awkwardness of business in Washington 
was manifest immediately.  Everyone wants to be a 
party to every negotiation.  The original Congressional 
bargainers were limited to members who believed in the 
need for an agreement.  Many who later asked to join the 
negotiation fervently wanted to sink it – either because 
they feared the loss of what they believed to be a winning 
political issue, or because they opposed the steps that 
would need to be taken to solve the budget problem.  
Among these, many members of the President’s party 
believed that the budget could be tamed without pain 
through a massive infrastructure program.  Many from 
the opposition believed that big tax cuts would increase 
growth to unprecedented and redeeming heights.  The 
President imposed discipline by holding the meetings in 
the White House, and the opposition leader backed the 
President and held his ground with his own members.
Sources say that debate among the negotiators was 
extremely sharp.  Although they had convened because 
they believed that the cause was urgent, they held widely 
differing values.  The deficit chasm was enormous, and 
“giving ground” could not be measured only in dollars, 
and not only at one moment in time.  For example, the 
two parties reportedly differed when it was tentatively 
agreed that the final program should be divided roughly 
equally between spending cuts and tax increases, and it 
was pointed out that by the end of ten years’ worth of 
savings needed to hit their budget targets, much of the 
money saved would be in the form of forgone interest 
costs.  The negotiators argued over whether the interest 
savings should be counted as spending reductions, which 
would reduce the amount of other spending cuts needed 
relative to revenue increases.
Another sticking point came on choices of budget targets, 
because budget outcomes are affected by economic 
growth.  Some members of the Congressional opposition, 
in particular, reportedly argued for a “growth bonus” in 
the accounting if their policy recommendations were 
accepted.  With difficulty, the negotiation held together 
on a principle of using cautious assumptions about the 
economy to force the negotiators on both sides to accept 
the difficult choices.
The sluggish economic recovery complicated the 
discussion.  On the one hand, the evident concerns in 
the financial markets had made the budget issue urgent.  
On the other hand, the weak economic recovery, still 
stumbling from the financial crisis of the end of the 
last decade, made many economists cautious about the 
restraining effects even of spending increases and tax cuts 
that unquestionably would be necessary in the longer 
term.  The first indications of an economic slowdown 
in China raised worries in the United States, as they 
had in the rest of the world.  The President reportedly 
represented vigorously the concerns of members of 
Congress of his party about the hardship that they see in 
their states and districts.
Accordingly, the two sides struck a bargain to enact a 
short-term stimulus program, which the opposition party 
did not want, in exchange for some changes in both the 
character of the stimulus – compared with the similar 
effort in 2009 – and in the deficit-reduction program.  
The opposition demanded temporary tax cuts as a part of 
the stimulus, and the absence of some spending increase 
proposals.  In the deficit reduction, the opposition asked 
for some additional spending restraint.  The deal was 
struck along those lines.
The near-term stimulus necessarily entailed a delay in 
the timing of the deficit-reduction program.  That raised 
concerns that the deficit reduction might be repealed even 
before it took effect, possibly through a shifting of the 
political winds between now and then.  It also risked a 
lack of credibility for the financial markets.  Although the 
staying power of the deal cannot be certain, indications 
over the negotiation period were favorable.  Several 
leading financial market players commented that if a 
bipartisan deal could be struck, and if both sides claimed 
ownership firmly, then the chances of the deal making its 
way to its effective date would be credible.  Also positive 
were statements from the Federal Reserve Chairman.  
Although he was careful to refrain from commitments on 
any political deal that was not final, the Chairman said 
– as clearly as he says anything – that a strong bipartisan 
agreement would have his support, and that the Fed 
would try to hold interest rates down to facilitate a more 
robust economic recovery.
Also troublesome was the treatment of health care, 
especially in light of last year’s reform law.  The opposition 
clearly was bitterly opposed to the law, but the budget 
deal could not reach its targets without additional savings 
in health care, and the complexity of the law made it 
intractable in this small-group negotiation.  To reach an 
accommodation, the President stipulated that the reform 
law was not the final word on the issue, the opposition 
accepted further targeted savings, and both sides accepted 
principles and a deadline for a new reform process.
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Although the announcement tonight strongly indicates 
that the negotiated agreement will be enacted into law, 
Washington was far from unanimous on the deal.  Both 
the President and the opposition leader will face intra-
party argument.  Members of the ideological wing of the 
President’s party already have derided him for, in their 
view, having given up too much.  Even the leadership 
of the President’s party was heard to grumble that the 
President should have included them earlier and with 
more authority in the negotiations.
On the other side, the opposition’s ideological extreme 
clearly believes that tax increases in any form should not 
have been a part of the deal.  They also have complained 
that making a deal with the President took him off of the 
political hook, when the weak economy and a potential 
renewed financial crisis left him vulnerable in the 2012 
election.
On that point, political seers are divided.  They tend to 
agree that the President himself would be at increased 
risk with a poor economy and financial dislocation.  On 
the other hand, they concede a chance that had a deal not 
been reached, the perceived best efforts at an economic 
remedy by the President, coupled with evidence of 
opposition intransigence, could have rebounded to the 
President’s advantage.  Thus, the political opposition 
quite possibly had no viable alternative but to negotiate 
in good faith.  Analysts also believe that a more stable 
economic environment will work to the advantage of all 
Congressional incumbents – ironically, even some who 
oppose the deal that achieved that security.
With the conclusion of the negotiations, the agreement 
is to be converted to legislative language and taken to the 
floor of the Congress late this week.  Approval is expected 
relatively quickly by Washington standards, with a goal of 
enactment including the annual appropriations that are 
a part of the package by the beginning of the next fiscal 
year on October 1.
But meanwhile, seasoned market players looking back on 
more than 30 years of budget battles in Washington are 
shell-shocked over what they have seen.  “I’ve watched 
this argument go back and forth for decades,” one trader 
who insisted on anonymity said this weekend.  “But I 
never thought that I would see something like this.”
A second highly placed market player expressed his 
surprise in political terms.  “Look, I’m a rock-ribbed 
conservative.  I deplore big government.  I hate taxes.  I 
certainly wouldn’t seek a deal exactly like this.  But it does 
look as though I will be sleeping a lot better at night.  
And if the concern is that the taxes will make us less 
competitive, well, our competitors are going to be raising 
taxes too.  For sure.”
One way or the other, whatever the views of political 
watchers, economists, or market players alike, it was a 
Washington story for the books.  Or as another Wall 
Street veteran said, “However long this deal lasts, I’m just 
glad this budget nightmare is over for a while.”
A great deal of damage already has been done by the nation’s accumulation of 
debt, and today’s economy makes the environment uncertain and the choices 
difficult.  But with a willingness to find a middle ground, this story can have a 
“happy ending.”  Our leaders have addressed difficult problems in the past, and 
they can – and should, indeed must – do so again.  Every American should work 
toward that end.
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